Getting From Here to There: The Rebirth of Constitutional Constraints on the Special Interest State by Baker, Lynn A. & Dinkin, Samuel H.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 40 | Issue 2 Article 5
Getting From Here to There: The Rebirth of




Copyright c 1999 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Lynn A. Baker and Samuel H. Dinkin, Getting From Here to There: The Rebirth of Constitutional
Constraints on the Special Interest State, 40 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 515 (1999),
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol40/iss2/5
GETTING FROM HERE TO THERE: THE REBIRTH OF




In Supermajority Rules as a Constitutional Solution,1 Profes-
sors John 0. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport have said
much with which we agree. We share their conception of federal
spending legislation as the product of a repeated prisoner's di-
lemma' that steadily increases the amount,' and decreases the
efficiency,4 of federal spending over time.5 We agree that a
supermajority requirement for enacting spending (or any other)
legislation would increase the various decisionmaking costs, in-
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Editors of the Review for inviting us to participate.
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1. John 0. McGinnis & Michael R. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules as a Consti-
tutional Solution, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 365 (1999).
2. See ic. at 372, 469; see also Lynn A. Baker & Samuel H. Dinkin, The Senate:
An Institution Whose Time Has Gone?, 13 J.L. & POL. 21, 30-34 (1997) (discussing
enactment of aggregate-welfare-reducing rent-seeking legislation in terms of prisoner's
dilemma).
3. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 367-83.
4. See i&L at 410-16.
5. As a preliminary matter, we share McGinnis and Rappaport's public choice
perspective on how and why interest groups are able to persuade a majority of the
legislature to provide their group special benefits at public expense, "even though a
majority of voters would not support the legislation." Id at 380; see also Baker &
Dinkin, supra note 2, at 30-34 (explaining why and how legislators trade votes to
secure legislation favoring their own constituents even when this legislation does not
have the support of a majority of the electorate).
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cluding the holdout costs, of passing such legislation,6 and there-
fore decrease the frequency with which it passes.' Finally, we
agree that "as the percentage of legislators required to pass a
bill increases, the percentage of efficient spending bills that are
enacted also should increase."'
Notwithstanding these central areas of agreement, we are
troubled by two important aspects of McGinnis and Rappaport's
analysis and proposal. First, we do not believe they have dem-
onstrated that the interest groups that benefit under the exist-
ing majoritarian system would in fact support the adoption of a
constitutional amendment that required the consent of a
supermajority to pass certain spending legislation.9 In Part I of
6. McGinnis and Rappaport describe decisionmaking costs as "the costs of secur-
ing the support of the requisite number of legislators to pass a bill through negotia-
tion and persuasion." McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1 at 404 n.173 (citing
JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 68 (1962)).
They add that "[tihese costs increase as the percentage of legislators required to
pass a bill increases, because it takes longer and more effort to secure an agreement
between a larger number of parties." Id They describe holdout costs as follows:
Holdouts occur when legislators who would otherwise support a bill refuse
to do so in order to extract additional benefits.... Under supermajority
rules, holdouts have more leverage [than under simple majority rules]
because there are fewer other legislators with whom the majority can
bargain to form a supermajority coalition.
Id. at 404.
We believe that decisionmaking costs include holdout costs, see Baker & Dinkin,
supra note 2, at 56-57, and we do not read the above definitions provided by
McGinnis and Rappaport to suggest that they disagree.
7. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 416-18; see also Lynn A. Baker,
Constitutional Change and Direct Democracy, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 143, 148-58
(1995) (noting that supermajority requirements make initiative amendments to state
constitutions more difficult to pass, resulting in a maintenance of the status quo);
see also Baker & Dinkin, supra note 2, at 56-57 (observing that some legislation
that might be enacted under a simple-majority rule would not pass under a
supermajocrity rule).
8. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 408. McGinnis & Rappaport define
"efficient" spending bills as those whose total benefits exceed their total costs. See
id. at 408.
9. As we read their article, the McGinnis-Rappaport Amendment would require
an unspecified supermajority of each house of Congress to pass a resolution authoriz-
ing the government to spend more than 90% of the total amount spent in the previ-
ous year, see McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 422-23, and "would require a
supermajority to pass bills that establish or expand entitlement programs," id. at
421 (emphasis omitted). They describe this as "a two-tiered supermajority rule." Id-
at 420.
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this Essay, we provide evidence not only that getting from here
to there may be more difficult than McGinnis and Rappaport
anticipate, but that their chosen destination may well be unat-
tainable under the U.S. Constitution. Second, even if we were
persuaded that the McGinnis-Rappaport Amendment could be
formally proposed and ratified, we contend in Part Il that the
Amendment would do little to decrease the aggregate cost to
society of the special interest legislation that Congress enacts.
I. THE SMALL STATE BIAS IN CONGRESS AND IN AMENDING THE
CONSTITUTION
In order to be an effective constraint on congressional spend-
ing, the supermajority rule that McGinnis and Rappaport pro-
pose must be a provision of the U.S. Constitution. Otherwise, of
course, a simple majority of both houses of Congress could sim-
ply repeal, or create an exception to, the rule whenever it proved
inconvenient.10 Amending the Constitution to include such a
supermajority rule, however, is likely to prove much more diffi-
cult than McGinnis and Rappaport expect, even though they
explicitly "recognize that even beneficial changes in a regime are
effectuated only with difficulty." 1
McGinnis and Rappaport aptly quote Machiavelli's observa-
tion that "innovation in regimes 'has as enemies all the people
who were doing well under the old order, and only halfhearted
defenders in those who hope to profit from the new.'" 2 But they
fail to appreciate the potentially fatal implications of
Machiavelli's observation for their own proposal, perhaps be-
cause of their assumption that "everyone has special interests
regarding some kinds of legislation and is a member of the dif-
fuse public for other kinds." 3 From this highly plausible prem-
ise, McGinnis and Rappaport go on to conclude that each citizen
10. McGinnis and Rappaport quite obviously understand this. See kd at 369-70,
399.
11. Id at 469.
12. Id (quoting NICcOL6 MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 17 (Robert M. Adams ed. &
trans., Norton 1992) (1513)).
13. Id. at 458; see also ia at 372 ("[Allmost all [citizens] are members of some
special interest group benefitting from some particular redistribution.").
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would be willing to surrender his own subsidy so long as all oth-
er citizens agreed to do the same, 4 presumably because all citi-
zens benefit equally under the existing regime.'5 We believe,
however, that some citizens systematically benefit much more
than others under the existing regime and, therefore, might well
not be willing to surrender their own subsidies even if all other
citizens would agree to do so.
In previous articles, we have demonstrated both theoretically
and empirically" that the existing structure of representation in
Congress, combined with the existing rules of majoritarian
decisionmaking, 7 affords small population states disproportion-
ately great representation, and therefore also disproportionately
great coalition-building power, relative to their shares of the
nation's population." This allocation of coalition-building power
importantly affects the distribution of gains from any pork-bar-
rel legislation Congress enacts, ensuring small population states
a disproportionately large slice, and large population states a
disproportionately small slice, of the federal "pie." 9 That is, the
existing regime promotes systematic wealth redistribution from
the larger states to the smaller states. 0
14. See id. at 372 (asserting that "almost all [citizens] are members of some spe-
cial interest group benefitting from some particular redistribution," and concluding
that "it would be irrational for members of any interest group to surrender their
subsidies unless members of other groups agree to do the same"); id. at 469 ("[N]o
one will give up their subsidies unless they can be certain that others will give up
theirs as well.").
15. McGinnis and Rappaport state that "[blecause everyone has special interests
regarding some kinds of legislation and is a member of the diffuse public for other
kinds, everyone is advantaged and disadvantaged by [a supermajority] rule in a fair-
ly unpredictable manner." IME at 458. If one subscribes to McGinnis and Rappapores
premise, the existing regime of simple majority rules is not logically distinguishable
in the resulting allocation -of its effects.
16. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Federalism: The Argument from Article V, 13 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 923 (1997); Baker & Dinkin, supra note 2.
17. Of course, Congress is at present only an imperfectly majoritarian body given
the Senate's cloture rule, which requires 60 votes to end debate regardless of the
number of Senators present. See Baker & Dinkin, supra note 2, at 29 & n.28, 61.
See generally Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 181 (1997) (discussing filibusters, including their antimajoritarian aspects).
18. See Baker & Dinkin, supra note 2, at 36.
19. See id. at 38.
20. See Baker, supra note 16, at 940-42 (showing for fiscal year 1995 "an average
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This means that the existing rules governing the enactment of
federal spending legislation have a clearly identifiable group of
systematic beneficiaries-the small population states that are
afforded disproportionately great (because equal) representation
in the Senate, and therefore also in Congress, relative to their
shares of the nation's population."1 Based on the 1990 Census,
thirty-two states currently are over-represented in the Senate.22
Each might be expected to oppose the adoption of a constitu-
tional amendment that would adversely affect its continued abil-
ity to obtain a disproportionately large share of the federal "pie."
Under Article V, the consent of two-thirds of the Senate (or a
convention called by two-thirds of the state legislatures) is nec-
essary even to propose an amendment, and ratification by three-
fourths of the states is required for adoption.23 Thus, if the sena-
tors (or legislatures) from as few as seventeen of these thirty-
two over-represented states opposed the proposal of the
McGinnis-Rappaport Amendment, or as few as thirteen states
opposed ratification, the continuation of the existing regime
would be ensured.
Thus, in order for the McGinnis-Rappaport Amendment to
have any chance at adoption, its authors would need to persuade
a substantial number of the states that clearly benefit from the
existing regime that they would do even better under the pro-
posed regime. This would require McGinnis and Rappaport to
demonstrate not only that aggregate social welfare would in-
crease if their amendment were adopted,24 but also that at least
twenty of the thirty-two states that disproportionately benefit
from the existing regime would each experience an increase in
aggregate welfare notwithstanding the anticipated loss of federal
redistribution in their favor. Moreover, to the extent that partic-
ular interest groups might have disproportionately great power
per capita income transfer of -$446 for residents of the ten largest states, compared
to an average per capita transfer of +$356 for residents of the ten smallest states");
Baker & Dinkin, supra note 2, at 38-41 (showing the degree of redistribution from
larger to smaller states in fiscal year 1995 to be statistically significant (p < 0.05)).
21. See Baker & Dinkin, supra note 2, at 24.
22. See id. at 71.
23. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
24. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 416-18, 424-27.
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within particular states (e.g., farmers in Iowa and Nebraska, the
dairy industry in Wisconsin), McGinnis and Rappaport similarly
would need to persuade each of these interest groups that they
would experience an increase in aggregate welfare notwithstand-
ing the anticipated loss of federal redistribution in their favor if
the McGinnis-Rappaport Amendment were adopted. We are far
from sanguine that McGinnis and Rappaport could provide the
relevant states and interest groups persuasive evidence on this
score.
McGinnis and Rappaport assert that they "are optimistic, nev-
ertheless, that supermajority rules [for the enactment of federal
spending legislation] can command widespread support" because
"all sides of the political spectrum are pressing proposed consti-
tutional amendments that are best understood as proposals to
dissolve the special interest state."25 They appear to have in
mind here the Balanced Budget Amendment and "an amend-
ment to require a two-thirds vote to raise taxes."26 In addition to
the obvious fact that neither amendment has yet to secure the
approval of two-thirds of the Senate,21 let alone three-quarters of
the states, it is significant that the proposed Balanced Budget
Amendment would not necessarily constrain federal spending.2"
It simply requires that any increase in federal spending be ac-
companied by an equivalently large tax increase.29 Small popula-
tion states will benefit disproportionately from any increase in
federal revenues, 0 and the Balanced Budget Amendment would
not alter the systematic wealth redistribution from larger states
to smaller states that we have shown occurs under the existing
25. Id. at 469.
26. Id at 371.
27. McGinnis and Rappaport acknowledge this fact. See id. at 371 n.21.
28. McGinnis and Rappaport acknowledge this: "[Blecause a Balanced Budget
Amendment restrains only debt, it does not prevent Congress from raising taxes or
printing money." Id at 406.
29. H.R.J. Res. 1, 104th Cong. § 1 (1995) ("Congress may, by law, amend [the
statement of receipts and outlays) provided revised outlays are not greater than re-
vised receipts" (emphasis added)). The amendment also allowed Congress to "pro-
vide ... for a specific excess of outlays over receipts by a vote directed solely to
that subject in which three-fifths ...of each House agree to such excess." Id.
30. See Baker, supra note 16, at 933-42; Baker & Dinkin, supra note 2, at 30-42.
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rules.3' Thus, the small population states would be more likely
to oppose the McGinnis-Rappaport Amendment than the Bal-
anced Budget Amendment.
Similarly, the amendment to require a two-thirds vote to raise
taxes would not alter the systematic redistribution from large to
small states that occurs under the existing regime. The amend-
ment simply would make it more difficult to increase the
amount of federal revenue available for such redistribution. The
McGinnis-Rappaport Amendment, in contrast, would make it
more difficult to maintain the amount of federal revenue avail-
able for such redistribution.32 This again suggests that the small
population states would be more likely to oppose the McGinnis-
Rappaport Amendment than an amendment requiring a two-
thirds vote to raise taxes.
II. WHY DECREASING SPENDING IS INSUFFICIENT TO CONSTRAIN
THE SPECIAL INTEREST STATE
Even if the necessary shifts in the American population were
to occur so that the states over-represented in the Senate num-
bered fewer than the thirteen necessary to block the ratification
of the McGinnis-Rappaport Amendment, we expect that the
Amendment would have little effect on the total cost to society
of the special interest legislation Congress would enact. The
McGinnis-Rappaport Amendment undoubtedly would make it
more difficult for Congress to enact spending legislation that
benefits special interests and to increase the total amount
of federal spending. We do not believe, however, that the
McGinnis-Rappaport Amendment would cause interest groups to
give up their pursuit of federal rent-seeking legislation. Rather,
and much more pessimistically, we believe the Amendment
would merely shift the locus of the interest groups' pursuit from
spending legislation to other types of special interest legislation
31. See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
32. That is, a likely effect of the McGinnis-Rappaport Amendment would be suc-
cessive 10% reductions in total federal spending until the budget reached an equilib-
rium level that the requisite supermajority would approve. See McGinnis &
Rappaport, supra note 1, at 422-27.
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including favorable regulations, quotas, restraints on trade, dif-
ferential taxation, giveaways, and unfunded mandates.
McGinnis and Rappaport anticipate this argument,33 and ac-
knowledge that regulatory benefits and tax preferences "proba-
bly would increase after the passage of a supermajority rule for
spending."3 4 We are not persuaded, however, that the increase in
regulatory benefits and tax preferences "would be considerably
smaller than the reduction in special interest spending caused
by the supermajority rule," yielding an overall reduction in spe-
cial interest legislation. 5 In particular, McGinnis and Rappaport
critically overlook the possibility that under the existing regime
the groups that are the beneficiaries of special interest spending
33.. See id. at 428-34.
34. Id- at 433. Indeed, McGinnis and Rappaport concede that [ilf special interests
do prove more successful in substituting tax preference and regulatory legislation for
spending legislation than we think they would be, we would consider applying
supermajority rules to those categories of legislation as well." Id at 432-33 n.273.
They give two reasons for why they nonetheless "would not begin constitutional re-
form with these more sweeping supermajority rules," /& at 433 n.273, but we find
neither reason persuasive.
First, McGinnis and Rappaport contend, without elaboration, that "there is a
strong argument for incrementalism in constitutional reform" that suggests that one
should "begin with the least radical constitutional change arguably sufficient to solve
the problem of governance at issue." Id As we explain in this Part, however, our
concern is precisely that the McGinnis-Rappaport Amendment is not in fact "suffi-
cient to solve the problem of governance at issue." In addition, the infrequency with
which the U.S. Constitution is amended seems compelling evidence against the feasi-
bility of a strategy of incrementalism in constitutional reform. Were the McGinnis-
Rappaport Amendment adopted, history suggests that one could expect a very long
wait before further amendments to that amendment would be successfully proposed,
let alone ratified.
Second, McGinnis and Rappaport argue that because tax preferences and regula-
tion are more difficult concepts to define than spending, supermajority rules tied to
these concepts are less amenable to enforcement by the judiciary than the McGinnis-
Rappaport Amendment. See id We are not persuaded, however, that 'spending" is
any easier to define than "regulation." For example, should one characterize as
"spending" or as "regulation" an offer of federal highway money to the states that is
conditional on the states having a certain minimum drinking age? Cf South Dakota
v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (holding congressional condition on highway spending
constitutionally valid). More importantly, McGinnis and Rappaport's argument over-
looks the dispositive fact that requiring a supermajority for all congressional enact-
ments as we propose, see infra Part III, does not even require a definition of
"spending" and should therefore be even more amendable to enforcement by the judi-
ciary than the McGinnis-Rappaport Amendment.
35. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 433.
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legislation would have similarly little difficulty obtaining other
forms of rent-seeking legislation if that were their preference.
That is, contrary to McGinnis and Rappaport's contention, one
might logically infer from various groups' successful pursuit of
special benefits through spending legislation under the existing
regime, not that they would face greater opposition if they
sought beneficial regulatory or tax legislation instead," but
rather that they would be similarly successful (and face similar-
ly little opposition) if they were to pursue other forms of rent-
seeking legislation. Regulatory or tax legislation that benefits
farmers, for example, is no more difficult to characterize as "pre-
serving traditional lifestyles and promoting an industry"3 than
is a direct subsidy to the same group. Similarly, any special in-
terest legislation that benefits small business, whether or not it
takes the form of a direct subsidy, can be characterized as "pro-
moting the economy."3' The key, in sum, is the identity of the
interest group receiving the benefit (and the benefit's suscepti-
bility to such uncontroversial characterization) and not the form
that the rent-seeking legislation takes. Thus, were the
McGinnis-Rappaport Amendment adopted, we would surely see
a different "population" of interest groups seeking beneficial reg-
ulatory or tax legislation than at present, including many groups
that currently benefit from subsidies. We would also expect,
however, that the groups that currently face little opposition in
their pursuit of beneficial spending legislation would face simi-
larly little opposition in their pursuit of beneficial regulatory or
tax legislation under the McGinnis-Rappaport regime.
III. SALVAGING THE MCGINNIS-RAPPAPORT AMENDMENT
It is possible that shifts in the American population might
someday occur that would cause the number of states over-rep-
resented in the Senate to fall below the thirteen currently nec-
36. See id at 430-31.
37. Id at 430.
38. E; see also, e.g., Contract With America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-21, § 202, 110 Stat. 847, 857 (justifying the reduction of the regulatory bur-
den on small businesses because "a vibrant and growing small business sector is
critical to creating jobs in a dynamic economy").
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essary to block the ratification of a constitutional amendment.
In that unlikely eventuality, our conclusion is not that McGinnis
and Rappaport should abandon their quest to rein in the modern
special interest state through the adoption of a constitutional
supermajority rule, but that they should become more ambi-
tious. The total cost to society of the special interest legislation
that Congress enacts can indeed be reduced, we believe, but only
through the adoption of a constitutional amendment that would
require a supermajority for all congressional enactments and not
just for certain spending legislation. McGinnis and Rappaport,
however, explicitly dismiss this possibility on two grounds.
First, they argue, a supermajority rule imposes holdout costs
that may exceed the benefits of the rule's ability to "filter" out
special interest legislation."s They are therefore eager to limit
the use of supermajority rules in order to minimize the chance of
"government shutdowns and the inclusion of inefficient provi-
sions" in federal appropriation and other laws.4" We agree with
McGinnis and Rappaport that as one moves from a simple ma-
jority rule toward a unanimity rule, the holdout costs and the
benefits of the filtering effect both increase.4 Near unanimity,
the incremental benefits of the filtering effect are low and the
incremental holdout costs are high. Near a simple majority, the
incremental benefits of the filtering effect are high and the in-
cremental holdout costs are low. It is important to note, howev-
er, that although there are surely points along this continuum at
which the increased holdout costs (which increase the difficulty
of enacting both aggregate-welfare-reducing special interest leg-
39. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 420-22.
40. Id. at 421. We might also note that the government shutdown so feared by
McGinnis and Rappaport is an extremely recent phenomenon, and that there have
been only a small number of shutdowns, all of very brief duration, in more than 200
years. See Anita S. Kirshnakumar, Note, Reconciliation and the Fiscal Constitution:
The Anatomy of the 1995-96 Budget "Train Wreck", 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 589, 590
& n.5 (1998) (observing that "[bludget breakdowns between Congress and the Pres-
ident had engendered federal government shutdowns nine times before 1995 [and]
none had lasted longer than three days").
41. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 402-18; see also Baker & Dinkin,
supra note 2, at 56-59 (observing that "a fifty-percent-plus-one decision rule differs
from a sixty-seven percent rule or a ninety-five percent rule only in the combination
of decision and expropriative costs which it is likely to impose").
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islation and aggregate-welfare-increasing public interest legisla-
tion) exceed the benefits of the greater difficulty in enacting spe-
cial legislation, there are surely other points at which these ben-
efits exceed the holdout costs. Thus, the issue, we believe, is not
whether to have a supermajority rule for the enactment of all
federal legislation, but rather which supermajority rule to adopt.
Second, McGinnis and Rappaport express the concern that a
supermajority rule for regulatory legislation, for example, would
not "filter public interest legislation from private interest legisla-
tion as well as a supermajority rule for spending" because "pub-
lic interest regulatory legislation is more likely to have concen-
trated special interest opponents than public interest spending
legislation."42 We disagree with their premise and therefore also
with their conclusion. Although federal regulatory legislation
may sometimes be enacted in the face of opposition by a concen-
trated interest group,43 such legislation is more often enacted
with enthusiastic interest group support. In addition, any spend-
ing legislation that benefits a particular interest group can be
reformulated as regulatory or other legislation that is equally
berieficial to the interest group." A subsidy for widget makers,
42. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 443. Indeed, McGinnis and Rappaport
go so far as to assert that "supermajority rules for regulatory legislation often would
have the perverse effect of strengthening the hand of the special interests." Id. at 444.
43. McGinnis and Rappaport give the example of "legislation seeking to regulate
the pollution caused by a production process" whose enactment would be resisted by
the producing companies. Id. at 443. Given that the supporters of the legislation are
"a classic instance of a diffuse group that is less effective at defending its interests
in the political process," iL at 444, one is left to wonder why McGinnis and
Rappaport suggest that such legislation would be enacted more often than rent-seek-
ing legislation that would benefit the concentrated interest group at the expense of
the diffuse public. If they in fact agree with us that regulatory legislation is more
often enacted with interest group support than with interest group opposition, they
should be more eager to expand their proposed amendment to include a
supermajority rule for the enactment of all federal legislation.
44. The example of pollution regulation provided by McGinnis and Rappaport, see
id. at 443-44, would result in a comparison of apples and oranges-a regulation op-
posed by an interest group would be compared to a subsidy sought by the same in-
terest group. Consider instead a subsidy to a polluting industry and a regulation
sought by the same industry, such as tradable pollution permits that are issued free
of charge to existing polluters. Presumably, the rent-seeking polluting industry would
prefer that either type of legislation be enacted under a simple majority rule rather
than under a supermajority rule.
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for example, can be reformulated as a price floor with tight im-
port restrictions, or as a quota on who is permitted (licensed) to
make widgets and how many they are permitted to make. In
sum, a supermajority rule must apply to regulatory (and other
nonspending) legislation as well as to spending legislation if it is
to decrease significantly the aggregate cost to society of the spe-
cial interest legislation Congress enacts.
CONCLUSION
In Supermajority Rules as a Constitutional Solution, Profes-
sors McGinnis and Rappaport have persuasively demonstrated
the role that mnajoritarian congressional decisionmaking and the
enactment of spending legislation have played in the continued
rise of the special interest State. Understanding how a problem
arose, however, may not be sufficient for understanding how to
mitigate it. The supermajoritarian constitutional amendment
proposed by McGinnis and Rappaport is thoughtful and creative
but, as we have shown, it also suffers two major flaws. Because
a significant number of states systematically (if unjustifiably)
benefit under the existing majoritarian system, the McGinnis-
Rappaport Amendment is unlikely ever to be adopted. And even
if it were adopted, the proposed amendment is too limited in its
scope to result in any significant reduction in the aggregate cost
to society of the special interest legislation Congress enacts.
Nevertheless, we share McGinnis and Rappaport's hope that
the original Constitution's constraints on the special interest
State will eventually be restored. And we expect that their "first
draft[ of a blueprint to restore the Framers' vision of a limited
government"45 will both inspire drafts by others and prove useful
in their making.
45. Cf id at 372 ("Although critics of fiscal supermajority rules, including the
Balanced Budget Amendment and the tax amendments, view them as radical innova-
tions, we argue that such rules are better seen as the first drafts of a blueprint to
restore the Framers' vision of a limited government.").
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